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Abstract—  This  paper  develops  a  disequilibrium 
model of land prices in the Netherlands. It shows that 
the behaviour of traded quantities and prices of Dutch 
land have some resemblance with a disequilibrium land 
market  model  developed  by  Søgaard.  An  error 
correction  model  based  on  Søgaard’s  model  generates 
significant results with GDP and the real interest rate as 
explanatory variables, but regrettably farm income nor 
government  demand  for  land  generate  significant 
results.  If  the  model  is  correct,  bubbles  are 
characteristic  for  the  Dutch  land  market,  and  this 
suggests  that  there  is  an  opportunity  for  Dutch 
government to improve on the timing of buying land for 
nature policy. 
Keywords— land market cycle, land prices, nature 
policy. 
I. INTRODUCTION  
Recently, Dutch government has changed its nature policy 
twice.  First,  in  1998  it  decided  to  buy  a  lot  of  land  for 
nature.  Four  years  later,  in  2002,  policy  changed. 
Government decided to buy less land and to reach the nature 
goals through private nature management. This 2002 change 
in  policy  was  partly  inspired  by  the  necessity  to  reduce 
government  expenditures  because  of  a  high  government 
budget deficit as a consequence of the recession (figure 1). 
It happened that as a consequence of these changes in policy 
most land for nature was bought at the moment that land 
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Figure 1. Government expenditures on nature and GDP growth 
The  development  of  Dutch  nature  policy  rises  two 
questions.  The  first  is  to  what  extent  money  could  have 
been saved by creating a fund that only buys land when land 
prices are low. This requires that the management of such a 
fund knows when land prices are too high. The second is to 
what  extent  the  fluctuations  in  demand  for  land  by 
government has reinforced the fluctuations in land prices. 
In  order  to  be  able  address  both  policy  questions  this 
paper  investigates  the  dynamics  of  the  agricultural  land 
market. We start with a disequilibrium land market model 
developed by Søgaard (1993) and show that this model for 
the Danish land market may also be applicable to the Dutch 
land  market  in  the  1970s  and  1990s  (section  2).  We 
integrate this analysis into an error correction model, and 
show that this model describes the development of Dutch 
agricultural  land  market  prices  between  1975  and  2005 
relatively  well  (section  3).  Effects  of  disequilibrium  on 
monopoly  power  may  reinforce  the  dynamics  of 
expectations formation in this context (section 4). Then we 
try to extend the model with agricultural profitability and 
government  expenditures  on  land.  Both  seem  not  to 
generate  significant  results,  but  this  may  be  caused  by 
incorrect specifications and problems with the data (section 
5). Suggestions for improvement conclude this draft version 
of  the  paper,  but  will  be  implemented  in  the  final  paper 
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Figure 2. Government expenditure on nature and real land price 
II. 2. THE LAND MARKET CYCLE 
The starting point from our analyses is a model developed 
by  Søgaard  (1993).  In  contrast  to  more  modern  studies 
(Awokuse and Duke, 2006; Tegene and Kuchler, 1991; Falk 
and  Lee,  1998;  Moss  and  Karchova,  2005),  Søgaard 
analyses  disequilibrium  behaviour  in  the  land  market 
explicitly. Correlated with the fluctuations in land prices are 
enormous  fluctuations  in  the  number  of  transactions,  and 
this  should  be  part  of  the  understanding  of  land  market 
dynamics. The logic behind both the dynamics in the land 
prices  and  the  number  of  transactions  is  an  adaptive 
expectation formation process. If the logic of this process is 
understood,  it  may  be  used  to  improve  the  timing  of 
expenditures on nature. 
The Søgaard model can be summarized as follows
1. The 
quantity  of  land  demanded  Q
d  is  determined  by  the 
difference between the current price P and the equilibrium 
price  P
e,  the  equilibrium  price,  and  the  expected  price 
increase  that  is  assumed  to  depend  on  the  recent  price 
increase ∆P: 
(1)  P P P P Q
e e d D   + + - - = 3 2 1 0 ) ( a a a a  
The same variables, but with the opposite signs for the 
coefficients, hold for the quantity of land supplied Q
s:  
(2)  P P P P Q
e e s D   - - - + = 3 2 1 0 ) ( b b b b  
By definition, when the market is in equilibrium, i.e. P = P-1 
= P
e, the quantity demanded and the quantity supplied are 
equal.  The  dynamics  starts  when  for  some  reason,  for 
example  an  expected  increase  in  agricultural  prices,  the 
equilibrium price changes. If the equilibrium price rises, by 
definition the current market price is too low, and therefore 
there  is  excess  demand.  At  disequilibrium  prices  the 
                                                            
1. 
1 All variables are logarithmic. 
shortest side of the market determines the quantity of land 
traded: 
(3)  ) , min(
s d Q Q Q =  
This implies that the quantity of land traded is lower than in 
equilibrium as long as the market is out of equilibrium. 
Based on the perceived excess demand, demanders will 
adjust the price at which they are willing to buy: 
(4)  ) ( 1
s d Q Q P - = D + e  
Because  market  participants  expect  increasing  prices  to 
continue,  land  suppliers  will  wait  till  the  expected  price 
increase is realized. During the process of price adjustment, 
because  of  speculative  expectations  of  further  price 
increases, there may be also excess demand if the price is 
above the equilibrium price. The further the price is above 
the equilibrium price, the more land suppliers start to take 
their  profits,  increasing  the  number  of  transactions  and 
reducing  the  rise  in  land  prices.  The  highest  number  of 
transactions  will  take  place  when  the  price  is  at  its 
maximum.  The  decrease  in  the  rise  in  land  prices  in 
combination  with  the  awareness  that  land  prices  are  too 
high  compared  with  the  equilibrium  price,  generates  a 
decrease in the quantity of land demanded. The market is in 
excess supply and the price decrease will stimulate potential 
buyers to wait till the price decrease is realized. According 
the same mechanism as when the price was rising towards 
the  equilibrium  price,  the  adjustment  process  will 
overshoot, and a new, cycle may start. When participants on 
the market behave according to rational expectations (i.e. at 
a  α1  and  β1  around  1  and  a  low  α3  and  β3)  the  price 
fluctuations outside the equilibrium price will be very small. 
In the real world there is imperfect information on the land 



































Figure 3.  A land market cycle for 1970-1986? 



































Figure 4. A land market cycle for 1990-2006? 
Figures 3 and 4
2 show Dutch land prices and quantities. 
These figures suggest that there may be something like a 
land cycle in the Netherlands. The traded area is only the 
land traded between farmers
3 and the real land prices are the 
average prices per ha of these transactions, deflated by the 
GDP price index. Something like a cycle is suggested in 
figure 3, where for example after 1978 a decrease in price 
starting from the top is accompanied with a decreases in the 
traded area, while after a decrease in price the number of 
transactions  increases.  Both  facts  are  consistent  with 
Søgaard’s theory. Nevertheless, also a lot of elements of the 
price-trade area relationship are not immediately consistent 
with the theory. This may be explained by the large number 
of  shocks  during  both  periods  (two  oil  crises,  two 
recessions, inflation) that may have changed the conditions 
on the land market enormously. Therefore, the challenge is 
to  model  the  external  conditions  relevant  for  the  land 
market and to test for the dynamics involved in the Søgaard 
model. 
III. 3. AN ERROR CORRECTION MODEL OF THE LAND MARKET 
The reduced form of the Søgaard model can be determined 
by substituting equations (1) and (2) in equation (4): 
(5) 
) ) ( ) (
) )( ( (
3 3 2 2
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Søgaard assumes that α2 equals β2, and we may assume that 
also  some  changes  in  exogenous variables  may  influence 
expectations  and  have  a  direct  influence  on  temporary 
supply  and  demand  conditions.  In  first  instance  we  will 
focus on two explanatory variables, i.e. the real interest rate 
and the real gdp. The long-term real interest rate obviously 
influences land prices as it is an asset where its value is 
determined  by  the  net  present  value.  It  may  also  have  a 
                                                            
2. 
2 Data are from Luijt, 2007. 
3. 
3 For figure 3 included complete farms, in figure 4 only land. 
short-term  effect,  because  it  influences  the  amount  of 
money  people  can  borrow.  Gross  domestic  income  may 
influence land demand in two ways. First, demand for land 
for non-agricultural use may rise, increasing land demand 
and  stimulating  speculation.  Second,  local  demand  for 
agricultural  products  rises,  and  therefore  agriculture  may 
become more profitable. This is a long-term effect. 
If  we  include  the  two  variables  in  an  error  correction 
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where Y is real GDP and r is the real long-term interest 
rate.
5 Because the long-term real interest rate may fluctuate 
a  lot  a  weighted  average  of  five  years  is  used  for  the 
equilibrium part of the formula. The estimation results of 
this  equation  for  1975-2005  (table  1)  show  that  all 
coefficients are significant and with the correct sign. Figure 
5  shows  that  the  dynamics  of  the  land  market  price  is 
captured  relatively  well  by  the  model,  where  the 
equilibrium  price  is  much more  stable  than  the  predicted 
price. 
 
Table 1. Estimation results 
  Log(Real Land price) 
Variable  Coefficient  T-ratio 
γ0: Constant  0.27  0.4 
γ1: Adjustment coefficient  -0.39  -5.9 
γ2: Long-term GDP coefficient  0.29  2.2 
γ3: Long-term real interest rate 
coefficient 
-0.07  -4.9 
γ4: Lagged change in real land 
price 
0.39  4.1 
γ5: Short-term change in GDP 
coefficient 
4.32  5.2 
γ6: Short-term change in real 
interest rate coefficient 
-0.02  -2.4 
Adjusted R
2  0.84   
D-W  2.3   
                                                            
4. 
4  After  simplifying  all  combined  coefficients,  and  using  the 
Søgaard assumption. 
5. 






























Figure 5. Actual and predicted land prices 
If the estimation of the land market dynamics is correct, 
then about 40% of the change in land price is taken into the 
next  period.  This  suggests  that  there  bubbles,  consistent 
with other research (Engsted, 1998; Featherstone and Baker, 
1987; Roch and McQuinn, 2001). The difference between 
the real price and the equilibrium price may provide a good 
indication of the probable development of the land price, 
and  a  fund  for  buying  land  can  profit  from  these 
fluctuations. 
IV. 4. THE LAND MARKET CYCLE AND MONOPOLY POWER 
A land market is characterized by imperfect competition. It 
is difficult to buy the land of your neighbour, and that is 
what you need if you want to increase the size of your farm. 
Cotteleer  et  al.  (2007)  explain  local  land  prices  by 
urbanization  effects  and  monopoly  power,  defined  as  the 
difference between the number of buyers and sellers divided 
the sum of sellers and buyers. The effect is significant and 
relatively high for land in the countryside. This could have 
consequences in the context of the Søgaard model, because 
this model explains large fluctuations in total land demand 
and supply. If the effect of monopoly power of buyers and 
suppliers would work out over time in the same way as over 
space,  the  monopoly  power  variable  could  fluctuate 
between  about  0.5  and  1,  implying  that  when  prices  are 
rising and suppliers are waiting to sell, they have the ability 
to set prices about 25% higher than normal prices. If prices 
are declining, prices may be 25% lower than in equilibrium. 
This  effect  may  be  part  of  the  mechanism  in  the  error 
correction  model  next  to  expectation  formation  that  is 
assumed in the Søgaard model. 
V. 5. FARM INCOME AND GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES ON 
LAND 
The error correction model of section 3 is not completely 
satisfactory  in  the  sense  that  you  would  expect  that 
agricultural dynamics influences the land market, not only 
GDP, while you would expect also that government demand 
for land influences the land market. Both hypotheses have 
an important policy relevance. The first has implications for 
the effectiveness of farm income policy, while the second is 
important  in  the  discussion  to  what  extent  government 
expenditures  on  the  land  market  destabilizes  the  land 
market. An investigation of both hypotheses is discussed in 
this section. 
First, demand for agricultural land will be determined by 
the  rent  on  marginal  rent.  At  least  since  the  1970s  it  is 
exceptional that complete farms are sold; most transactions 
consider land, and land is demanded to realize economies of 
scale. Therefore the value of the extra land is important, and 
this implies that average farm income is not relevant as an 
explanatory variable. The problem with the concept of the 
rent of marginal land is that it is not easy to measure. We 
tried several estimates of marginal land rend based on the 
estimation of production functions, but neither worked out. 
This is consistent with some literature (Falk and Lee, 1998; 
Moss  and  Katchova,  2005),  but  others  find  significant 
effects  of  land  rents  on  prices  (for  example,  Burt,  1986; 
Weersink et al, 1999; Gutierrez et. al., 2007).
6 An important 
reason behind these problems is that both for capital and 
labour imputed costs are relevant that are lower than the 
market value, but we don’t know how much lower. 
Demand by government of land is also not easy to find 
out.  Part  is  organized  well  through  an  organisation 
specialized  on  buying  land,  but  also  municipalities  and 
other agents buy land. Furthermore, not all land demand by 
the specialized organization is a net demand; sometimes this 
organization buys land in order to sell it later in the context 
of an increase in efficiency of land use. Therefore, the real 
pressure on the land market by this organization is not easy 
to measure. 
We have tried to incorporate both different measures of 
the profitability of marginal land and government demand 
for land in the equation, but did not find significant effects. 
The  lack  of  correlation  between  farm  income  and  land 
prices is a fact that is also found elsewhere, but it remains 
relatively unsatisfactory. Therefore, an attempt will be made 
later to improve the indicators of the marginal land rent. 
                                                            
6. 
6 Søgaard even found an incorrect sign for land rent.   5 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
GDP and the real interest rate in combination with an error 
correction mechanism that may be related with imperfect 
information  but  also  with  monopoly  power,  seems  to 
explain  land  price  behaviour  in  the  Netherlands  between 
1975 and 2005 relatively well. If the model is correct, there 
are opportunities to save money on nature policy through a 
better timing of government land demand, and such a policy 
may stabilize the land market. 
This last effect has not been shown, but this may be caused 
by incorrect specification of the model. Therefore, in the 
final paper explicit tests on exogeneity will be performed 
and possibly a vector autoregression estimation formulation 
will  improve  results.  Also  improved  data  may  improve 
results. Till we have solved this problem, we have to be 
careful  with  respect  to  conclusions  about  the  effect  of 
government land demand behaviour on the land market. 
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